In this paper, we estimate a system of quantile regressions for four sets of major financial institutions (commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds and insurance companies) using daily data. Our state-dependent sensitivity value-at-risk (SDSVaR) approach enables us to quantify the size and duration of risk spillovers among financial institutions as a function of the state of financial markets (tranquil, normal, volatile). We show that while small during normal times, equivalent shocks lead to considerable spillover effects in volatile market periods. The results highlight that estimates on spillover magnitudes that do not condition on the state of financial markets may substantially over-or understate spillover effects. We show that investment banks and, especially, hedge funds play a major role in the transmission of shocks to the other financial institutions. Given our high frequency data, we can trace out the spillover effects over time in a set of impulse response functions and find that they reach their peak after 10 to 20 days. Finally, the evidence provides further support for the notion that different hedge fund styles tend to converge during crisis times.
"Continued focus on counterparty risk management is likely the best course for addressing systemic concerns related to hedge funds".
Ben S. Bernanke (2006) 
Introduction
From a regulatory perspective, one of the most important lessons from the 2007/2009 financial crisis may be that systemic risk and spillover effects are significantly underestimated in most widely used risk measures and that standard risk measurement instruments, such as valueat-risk (VaR), need to be adjusted to adequately reflect overall risk.
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In this paper, we propose a state-dependent sensitivity (SDS) VaR for quantifying the spillover effects among systemically important financial institutions. Our model explicitly accounts for the effects of different market states (tranquil, normal, and volatile) on the magnitude of risk spillovers. Further, we model the simultaneity that arises from the feedback effects of interdependent financial institutions. In particular, we apply two-stage least squares to a quantile regression setting to obtain consistent coefficient estimates. We perform this analysis in a system of four sets of financial institutions (commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies, and hedge funds), in which each type of financial institution is represented by an index of several financial firms.
A recent paper by Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2010) empirically investigates the interconnectedness among financial institutions using monthly data. They find insurance companies, banks, brokers, and hedge funds have become highly interrelated over the past decade. Commercial banks and insurers are estimated to have a more significant impact on hedge 1 In line with literature, we define systemic risk as the risk that the failure of a participant to meet its contractual obligations may in turn cause other participants to default with a chain reaction leading to broader financial difficulties (BIS, 1994) funds and investment banks than vice versa. Their systemic risk measures contain predictive power to identify financial crisis periods. In contrast, we propose a systemic risk measure that is based on different core variables (value-at-risk measures instead of returns), and uses different methodological concepts. Our study is the first that provides empirical estimates of the size of intra-month spillover effects from hedge funds to other financial institutions. Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010) apply quantile regression for binary dependent variable models in order to measure contagion effects among hedge fund styles. Similarly, Chan, Getmansky, Haas, and Lo (2006) and more recently Billio, Getmansky, and Pelizzon (2009) propose a regime switching framework to estimate the probabilities of switching to a "systemic risk regime". The joint distribution of hedge fund returns is studied by Brown and Spitzer (2006) who measure the dependence structure between hedge fund strategies using copulae. While the first two studies estimate the effects on state probabilities rather than the size of the spillover effects, the latter study provides estimates on the tail-dependence structure without presenting empirical estimates of the magnitude of potential risk spillovers.
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Our empirical results suggest that shocks to hedge funds result in significant spillovers to investment banks and to insurance companies. Commercial banks exhibit statistically significant spillover effects to investment banks and insurance companies, but the economic magnitude is much smaller relative to the spillovers from hedge funds. Specifically, we show that, during market distress, a one percent increase in the value-at-risk of the hedge fund industry leads to a 0.6% increase in the VaR of investment banks and a 0.3% increase in the VaR of insurance companies. In contrast, again during market distress, a one percent increase in the value-at-risk of commercial banks results in a 4.1% increase in the VaR of insurance companies and a 4.0% 2 In fact, the general belief in 2005 was that "current state-of-the-art methods do not allow us to capture the systemic risk component of a hedge fund's position" (see Danielsson, Taylor, and Zigrand, 2005). increase in the VaR of investment banks.
3 Spillovers during calm times are small and generally statistically not significant. In summary, the results emphasize the importance of controlling for different states of the economy when estimating spillover effects.
The paper complements a growing literature that examines the potential transmission channels between financial institutions in general and from hedge funds to the financial system in particular. The majority of the related literature examines contagion and systemic risk in the banking sector. The main findings on systemic risk generating factors are thereby the growth in credit risk transfers (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010; Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marquez-Ibanez, 2010) , investor sentiments (Shleifer and Vishny, 2009; Hott, 2009) , and the interaction of liquidity shortages and solvency problems among banks (Diamond and Rajan, 2005) . 4 Gropp, Lo Duca and Vesala (2009) , and Gropp and Moerman (2004) , as well as Hartmann, Straetmans, and De Vries (2006) show that distress in one banking system transmits across national borders to other banking systems. Brownlees and Engle (2010) and Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) propose marginal expected shortfall (MES) and systemic expected shortfall (SES) as a measure of systemic risk and an indicator of financial crises. Thereby, high levered firms show higher MES, whereas the impact of leverage differs across market states. BrokerDealers are identified as the most systemically relevant sector.
Implications of financial fragility for the real economy are analyzed by Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) who find evidence that constrained firms bypass attractive investment opportunities and are forced to sell more assets to fund their operations. Furthermore, sectors that 3 Throughout the study we will refer to a "one percentage increase". Note, however, that the value-at-risk is measured in percentage points so that a one percentage increase actually means an "increase by one percentage point". 4 One interesting aspect of the study by Hott (2009) is that uninformed "mood investors" may create a price bubble even in the absence of speculation.
are highly dependent on external financing also suffer the greatest adverse impact on value added during banking crises (Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel, 2007) .
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A few recent studies also provide evidence of contagion in the insurance industry. Allen and Gale (2005) argue that the considerable growth in the transfer of credit risk across sectors of the financial system has lead to a shift in risk from the banking sector to the insurance sector. Fenn and Cole (1994) investigate the contagion effects among life insurance companies when major insurance companies report significant write downs of their portfolios. Negative wealth effects on shareholders of other insurance companies are shown to be particularly strong if the write downs refer to junk bonds or commercial mortgages.
Until recently the literature generally seemed to agree that hedge funds are systemically important and that this importance is likely to increase even more so in the future (Danielsson, Taylor, and Zigrand (2005) , Garbaravicius and Diereck (2005) , Kambhu, Schuermann, and Stiroh (2007) , and Chan, Getmansky, Haas, and Lo (2006) among others).
As opaque and highly leveraged investment partnerships, hedge funds have received prominent attention as a potential source of contagion, a transmission channel of risk between different financial institutions and potential amplifiers of systemic risk in financial markets. If highly leveraged hedge funds are forced to liquidate large position at fire-sale prices, counterparties sustain heavy losses. This may lead to further defaults or threaten systemically important institutions not only directly as counterparties or creditors but also indirectly through asset price adjustments (Bernanke, 2006) . 5 Another implication of these findings is that full diversification may in fact not be desirable. Although it reduces each institution's individual probability of failure it also increases the probability of systemic risk (see Wagner, 2010) .
Our results are complementary to studies that are confined to estimating the average impact on the response variable like, e.g., Halstead, Hegde, and Klein (2005) , who use an event study approach to estimate contagion effects from hedge funds during the LTCM crisis in 1998, or Ding, Getmansky, Liang, and Wermers (2009) , who investigate fund flows during periods of financial distress. 6 Furthermore, for the spillover effects at the disaggregated hedge fund strategy level, our results confirm the findings of the recent literature on the interrelation among hedge funds. For instance, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) find that market liquidity and funding liquidity are interrelated. In particular, hedge funds provide liquidity to otherwise illiquid markets as long as access to credit is easy. However, traders are concerned about margin calls and avoid high margin positions when funding liquidity dries up. At that point, prices are more driven by funding liquidity considerations rather than by movements in fundamentals.
Our approach is most closely related to Adrian and Brunnermeier's (2010) CoVaR approach. However, we focus on spillover effects among financial institutions, rather than the contributions of financial institutions to systemic risk. We furthermore apply a more flexible methodology that allows for the fact that spillovers are determined simultaneously and explicitly measures the spillover effects during a crisis. Finally, the quantile regression setup and the dynamic structure of the model were inspired by Engle and Manganelli's (2004) CAViaR model.
Our SDSVaR model is an indirect approach to measuring spillover risk. Relevant determinants such as leverage, liquidity and hedge funds' asset holdings are not available, so that we cannot explain the causes of risk spillovers. On the other hand, measuring risk through daily value-atrisk also has some advantages. All risk relevant shocks are likely to be reflected in an institutions value-at-risk. We can therefore also capture risks that arise from complex relationships among 6 In these studies the response variable is abnormal stock market returns and hedge fund flows, respectively.
The response variable in our study is the value-at-risk of different financial institutions and hedge fund strategies.
financial institutions. For instance, in an article from August 9 th 2007, The Economist addresses the complex relationship between the three major prime brokers (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and, at that time, Bear Stearns) and hedge funds. Investment banks that own corporate bonds may use the swap market to hedge against corporate defaults. But if hedge funds take the other side of the swap and at the same time depend on loans from the same bank, the spillover risk between the bank and the hedge fund increases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the SDSVaR approach of modeling contagion risk conditional on the state of the economy. In section three we discuss the general implications of this model in a static setting using the full sample range but also present the dynamic development in the spillover estimates in a one-stepahead forecast setting. We furthermore show how impulse response functions can be used to illustrate the dynamics of risk spillovers. In section four we analyze the risk spillovers, at a disaggregated level, of hedge fund strategies. Some concluding remarks are drawn in Section 5.
Since transparency and representativeness are a major concern when working with financial data in general and hedge funds in particular, we provide a detailed appendix on data source, index constituents and representativeness. Thus, our empirical findings concerning the spillover effects from the hedge fund index are likely to be close but generally somewhat lower than what could be expected if a truly representative hedge fund index was available. To derive the SDSVaR approach, we start with the standard value-at-risk of a single type of financial institution. The value-at-risk is the estimated loss of a financial institution that, within a given period (usually 1 to 10 days), will be exceeded with a certain probability θ (usually 1% or 5%). Thus, the 1-day 5% VaR shows the negative return that will not be exceeded within this day with a 95% probability,
Recently, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) 
Using quantile regression, the CoVaR is estimated by regressing the θ -% quantile of the return distribution on a constant and j VaR . The CoVaR between institutions i and j is then given by the fitted values from this regression:
where i R is the time series of institution i returns. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) extend Equation (4) by adding a set of lagged regressors 1 t M − that capture liquidity risk, market risk, and credit risk, thus generating a flexible risk measure that reacts sensitively to the underlying return process. 9 In Equation (4) the spillover coefficient β is an average over all states of the economy. In this paper, we examine whether β , which measures the spillover intensity of 
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We propose a two-step approach to estimate the spillover coefficients β . In contrast to the CoVaR model of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) , which relies on quantile regression to model the distribution of returns (see Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Koenker, 2005) , the SDSVaR proposed in this paper models the distribution of the value-at-risk, not the returns. Since the 5% quantile of the return distribution is defined to be the value-at-risk, estimation of the CoVaR model requires setting the quantile θ to 5% or 1%. In contrast, we obtain the value-at-risk in a preceding step which enables us to regress over the whole range of VaR quantiles. 
with , m t μ as the mean of institution m at time t. In the following we consider four financial institutions so that m = i, j, k, and l. It has become practice to model , m t σ by extracting the conditional standard deviation from a GARCH model (Kuester et al., 2006 ). This will account for the time-varying volatility of returns and leads to substantial improvements in the sensitivity of the VaR to changes in the return process. We will therefore follow this practice. In a second step, β in Equation (6a)) are statistically significant and therefore constitute valid instruments to identify the system (Wooldridge, 1999) . The fitted values of Equation (6a) constitute the SDSVaR of institution i,
Note that the coefficient vector
depends on the state of the economy. When using financial institutions or industry aggregates, the quantiles of the VaR can be interpreted as reflecting the state or condition of financial markets. Thereby, high quantiles robustness check we also computed the VaR series in Equation (5) using the asymmetric slope version of Engle and Manganelli's (2004) CAViaR model and obtain similar empirical results throughout this study.
12 See Powell (1983) for the derivation of the statistical properties of this estimator.
correspond to tranquil market periods and low quantiles to situations of financial distress. When modeling spillover risk it seems natural that VaR measures are interdependent among financial institutions and that a set of observed VaR measures at a given day are determined simultaneously. To address the bias that is introduced by this simultaneous framework, we adapt the methodology from two-stage least squares to our quantile regression setting. This additional effort is rewarded with consistent estimates that account for the fact that the VaRs of interdependent financial institutions are determined simultaneously.
We interpret SDSVaR (i) as an extended value-at-risk model that accounts for the spillover or contagion risk that is caused by related financial institutions, and (ii) as an approach to explicitly reveal the size of the spillover risk through coefficients that vary over time as well as over different states of the economy.
Equation (6a) contains the following variables:
The value-at-risk of financial institution j, k, and l: These variables can be the VaRs of related institutions or the aggregate VaR measure of the whole system. The coefficients of interest are 
Measuring Spillover Effects among Financial Institutions

Data
The subprime crisis of 2007/2009 spread from mortgage-backed securities and CDOs to commercial banks and on to hedge funds and investment banks. 13 Credit risk has furthermore shifted from commercial banks to insurance companies (Allen and Gale, 2005) . Consequently, we investigate the following four financial institutions using daily data for the time period 13 See Brunnermeier (2008) for a comprehensive discussion of these linkages.
14 A detailed description of all variables is given in Appendix A. derived from a hedge fund universe. Thus, although the HFRX index may be contaminated with a measurement error, the bias from using the HFRX is likely to be small.
Static SDSVaR Estimation
In this section, we present the results for estimating Equation (6). We are particularly market periods. We choose the 75% quantile for tranquil market conditions, the 50% quantile for normal market conditions, and the 12.5% quantile for conditions of financial distress. The solid black regression line shows the spillover coefficient of Equation (4) VaR to the VaR of investment banks to be about 0.09. This corresponds to the straight black line in the lower panel of Figure 1 . 18 If we interpret this situation as normal market conditions, it is 16 The choice of specific quantiles introduces a certain degree of arbitrariness in our model. During tranquil market times risk spillovers are generally close to zero so that the choice of a specific upper quantile has no significant effect on the results. It is also plausible to choose the 50%-quantile for normal market times. Our empirical results, however, react more sensitively to quantile changes for volatile market periods. In this context, the choice of the 12.5%-quantile reflects the trade-off between measuring the tails of the VaR distribution where the largest spillovers occur and an increasing exposure to outliers due to a decreasing number of observations. In section 3.4 we therefore present the changes on the results from using a 15% and a 10%-quantile model.
17 Similar pictures can be seen for other combinations of financial institutions. The scatter plot above, however, is most suitable for demonstrating the effects of state dependencies. Furthermore, our empirical results in the next section suggest that shocks from the hedge fund industry are of particular importance.
striking to see the slope of this coefficient to be almost three times higher during market conditions of financial distress. Similarly, the spillover effects are close to zero during tranquil markets.
In order to obtain a more general view of the SDSVaR model, Equation (6) is estimated as a system for all of the four financial institutions (insurance companies, commercial banks, investment banks and hedge funds) and for three different market states (tranquil, normal, and volatile). Table 1 shows the results for the spillover coefficients and the autoregressive term from Equation (6). The main interest lies in the spillover coefficients from institutions j , k, and l to institution , . Shocks are originating from the financial institutions denoted in the columns of the What is typically observed, however, are return series showing alternating patterns of negative and positive changes so that negative shocks with lag coefficients above one are followed by positive shocks with coefficients below one.
Thus, after a shock, the VaR quickly returns to more stable environments rather than increasing indefinitely. Finally, the VaR is directly tied to the return series which in turn is stationary. 22 To give an example, in an article from the 23 rd October 2008 The Economist reports that "In Europe many funds found that the assets they pledged as collateral in return for financing from Lehman have become trapped in the bankruptcy process as administrators strain to work out which assets genuinely belong to clients. Worse still, many assets have simply disappeared, thanks to a standard industry practice called "rehypotecation", in which prime brokers use clients' collateral to raise financing of their own." funds and banks are interconnected, the failure of hedge funds leads to capital losses among investment banks (Klaus and Rzepkowski, 2009 ).
We also find that commercial banks increasingly affect insurance companies moving from tranquil to volatile market periods. These results are in line with Allen and Gale (2005) who state that credit risk has been considerably transferred from the banking sector to insurance companies.
Finally, we measure the amount of systemic risk in each state by summing up the spillover coefficients over the institutions. 23 While this figure does not have a natural unit of measurement, it can be used to compare (i) the amount of risk that each financial institution contributes to overall risk, and (ii) the amount of systemic risk within each market state. We estimate systemic risk to be 1.106 during volatile periods which is almost ten times higher than the value during tranquil periods. It is also interesting to note that more than 90 percent of total systemic risk stems from hedge funds, largely coming from the large effect of hedge funds on the VaR of investment banks.
Dynamic SDSVaR Estimation
In this section, we estimate the SDSVaR as a series of one-step-ahead forecasts using a rolling window of 500 trading days. This requires estimating the SDSVaR for different quantiles and selecting the quantile model that best represents the economic conditions at time t. For instance, a SDSVaR model with coefficient estimates that correspond to the lower tail of the distribution is applied during times of financial distress. In this situation, a forecast incorporates the "coefficients of the crisis" rather than some average measure which may not be representative of the dependence structure during this time. In fact, recent studies show that these univariate VaR models are already very efficient so that room for improvements is marginal at best (Kuester et al., 2006) . The contribution of the SDSVaR model to the body of existing VaR techniques is that (i) it explicitly reveals the magnitude of the spillover at time t, and (ii) it provides useful information for 24 The short memory in the autoregressive structure of the SDSVaR model lends itself to one-step-ahead forecasts whereas multi-step-ahead forecasts will quickly loose in efficiency. The forecast performance will also depend on the stability of the current economic condition. As shown below, the quantile selection procedure in fact does not lead to erratic "quantile hopping" so that the error of selecting the wrong quantile for the forecast remains One-step-ahead forecasts are constructed using coefficients that can change on a daily basis, thus creating an additional source of uncertainty. Although this "quantile hopping" can in principle lead to very erratic forecast behavior, Panel A in Figure 2 demonstrates that the series of one-step-ahead forecasts accurately follows the development of the return process over time.
To strengthen this argument, the right graph of Panel C shows the quantiles selected by the model. 28 In the period before 2007, only medium and upper quantiles are used for forecast construction, whereas low quantiles are selected for the period of the financial crisis. Note that the variability in the quantiles decreases strongly during this period so that any quantile selection error is reduced during this time.
Feedback Effects and Persistence of Risk Spillovers
The risk spillover estimates from the preceding section marked the responses of financial institutions within the same day. If Institutions are in fact interdependent and shocks are persistent it would seem reasonable (i) to expect reactions to the initial shock to last over a longer time period and (ii) to observe feedback effects among financial institutions. In this section, we address this issue by employing impulse response functions that show the dynamic behavior of a system of SDSVaRs in the presence of a one time shock to one financial 28 Quantiles are selected on the whole sample rather than the rolling window. In order to determine market conditions adequately it is desirable to include a large time window that covers all market phases.
institution. Figure 3 shows the impulse response functions for tranquil, normal, and volatile market conditions. This corresponds to θ being equal to the 75%, the 50%, and the 12.5% for the VaR of the investment bank sector, for which the response is estimated to be more than half the size of the initial shock to the hedge fund industry. In fact, for very low quantiles the crisis coefficients do not lead back to a steady state so that the responses are explosive. This simply reflects the fact that if, over a period of time, each day would be dominated by extreme negative shocks, the VaRs of financial institutions would respond by turning more negative each day. We therefore return to the normal market state coefficients after the day of the shock.
We believe this setting to be reasonable. Even during a financial crisis extreme negative shocks only occur over a few days but generally lead to volatility clustering containing also positive returns. This also has implications for commercial banks' shock response over time.
Since risk spillovers from hedge funds are estimated to be the largest for commercial banks during normal market times, shocks in the banking sector are more persistent with only about 50% of the initial shock being adjusted after two months. Note that part of the response of insurance companies is likely to be due to their exposure to both, hedge funds and commercial banks. Finally, the four graphs at the bottom of Figure 3 also show the effects of a 15% and a 10%-quantile model represented as upper and lower borders of the shaded bands around the 12.5%-quantile estimates. The width of those bands suggests that the choice of a specific quantile may have some effect on the estimates for commercial banks but has only little effect on the results from the other three institutions.
Our estimates concerning the duration of spillover effects also help to resolve an apparent conflict with other recent findings. For instance, Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2010) find the returns of commercial banks and insurers to have a more significant impact on the returns of hedge funds and investment banks than vice versa. However, the authors estimate spillover effects that occur between months. The majority of the spillover effects in our model, however, are effective within one month. These intra-month effects remain unobservable to empirical studies based on a monthly frequency.
Hedge Fund Styles and Financial Institutions
While many studies focus on the interrelationship between hedge funds and other financial institutions, a number of authors have also emphasized the high "degree of connectedness" among different hedge fund strategies (see e.g. Khandani and Lo, 2007) . In this context, the relationship between market liquidity and funding liquidity is regarded as one key component.
For instance, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) Table 2 shows the response of financial institutions to the four hedge fund strategies while Panel B shows a network diagram that highlights the increased interconnectedness among hedge fund strategies during financial crises.
<< Table 2 about here >>
In line with our previous results, the spillover effects are small and close to zero for tranquil market periods. During normal market conditions, most of the coefficients are still below 0.04. These estimates are likely to result if one would ignore differences due to changing market conditions. The most striking results are again visible for the coefficient estimates during volatile market periods. In particular, the event driven, the relative value, and the global macro strategy show substantial spillovers to all three financial institutions, often with coefficient values being roughly ten times the size of their normal condition counterparts.
Panel B shows a network diagram of risk spillovers among different hedge fund strategies
where the connecting line width is proportional to the spillover size. 29 From this panel we find some evidence for a higher degree of connectedness during volatile market periods as event driven, equity hedge, and global macro seem to be more interrelated during this time. Therefore, we find evidence for the increasing convergence of hedge fund strategies and the impact of crowding among hedge funds. 30 Both of these effects are ignored in traditional risk measures.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a state-dependent sensitivity value-at-risk (SDSVaR) which measures spillover effects in a simultaneous equation system conditional on the state of the economy. We estimate a system of quantile regressions for four sets of major financial institutions (commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds and insurance companies) using daily data. Conditioning on the state of financial markets (tranquil, normal, volatile), we find the size and duration of risk spillovers among financial institutions to change substantially between market phases. While risk spillovers are small during normal times, equivalent shocks lead to considerable spillover effects during crisis times. For instance, during normal market times, a one percentage point increase in the VaR of hedge funds is estimated to increase the VaR of investment banks by 0.05 percentage points. The same shock, however, increases the VaR of the investment bank industry by 0.6 percentage points during times of financial distress. 29 Since most spillovers are bidirectional, the line width is computed as the sum of the two spillover coefficients and is only drawn for positive sums. 30 Note that in contrast to Khandani and Lo (2007) who measure interdependency using linear correlation coefficients, our spillover coefficients control for the effects of other institutions and capture the non-linearity that is present in the tails of the VaR distribution.
Our empirical results further show that, again during market distress, a one percent increase in the value-at-risk of the hedge fund industry leads to a 0.3% increase in the VaR of insurance companies. Using a set of impulse response functions, we trace out the responses of the same shocks over time and find that they reach their peak after 10 to 20 days. Finally, we provide empirical support for the notion that hedge funds tend to become more interconnected during times of financial distress.
Accordingly, the main conclusions from our empirical results are that hedge funds play an important role as transmission channels and amplifiers of systemic risk. To our knowledge, we are thus the first to quantify the intra-month spillover effects from hedge funds to the rest of the financial system. Furthermore, we have shown that controlling for different market states is crucial for obtaining reliable spillover estimates.
Although our SDSVaR model is useful for measuring and quantifying spillover effects, it does not explain the mechanisms underlying the estimated spillovers. In his testimony for the U.S. House of Representatives Lo (2008) emphasizes that in order to construct specific measures that are sufficiently practical and encompassing to be used by policymakers, hedge funds may be required to provide more transparency on a confidential basis to regulators, e.g. leverage, liquidity, counterparties and holdings.
Still, our SDSVaR approach constitutes a powerful policy tool for quantifying short-term risk spillovers and contagion effects among financial institutions. It may help regulators to identify the systemically most relevant financial institutions in the financial system. Finally, the SDSVaR provides useful information to investors during crisis times by revealing substantial interdependencies among financial institutions that would otherwise remain unobservable in standard approaches that do not explicitly control for state dependency. We generate the index weights for the commercial bank, investment bank, and insurance company indices using principal component analysis. 32 If X is the TxN matrix of returns, Ω is the sample covariance matrix, and ′ Ω = ΓΛΓ is the spectral decomposition of Ω , then the principal components of X can be obtained by
where
is the (time) demeaned return matrix and the first column of , contains the Nx1 eigenvector that corresponds to the largest eigenvalue of
33 While this eigenvector points in the general direction of the data, its corresponding eigenvalue indicates the amount of variation that is explained by the first principal component. Figure A .1 shows the investment bank index and the corresponding index weights generated from the price series of eight of the 32 Other commonly applied constituent weights are market value weights and equal weights. The former approach assigns large weights to large financial institutions such as JP Morgan (20% on average) but assigns only small weights to companies such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers (about 2% and 5% on average, respectively).
In the latter approach time series with higher variance have a higher influence on the index. 
Appendix B: Properties of the HFRX Equally Weighted Hedge Fund Index
The HFRX hedge fund index is not fully representative of the entire hedge fund universe. Yet, it is the only hedge fund index that is also available on a daily frequency. In this section, we compare the distributional properties of the HFRX index with those of the entire, and thus representative, hedge fund industry. Differences in variance, asymmetry and fat tails may be used to infer the size and the direction of a possible bias from using the HFRX index. We thereby compare the return properties using monthly returns since our representative hedge fund index is only available at a monthly frequency. Because our empirical findings are obtained from daily data, an implicit assumption with this approach is that the relation between both return distributions that we find using monthly data also holds if we compared the return distributions using daily data.
The HFRX index is an investable index. In general, investable indices suffer from the same biases (e.g., survivorship bias, instant history bias) than their non-investable counterparts.
Investable indices represent passively managed fund of funds net of all fees and expenses.
However, in order to avoid self-reporting bias and to reduce other biases which dominate noninvestable hedge fund indices, daily data on single hedge fund basis is taken from managed accounts. In particular, the instant history bias and survivorship bias is of lower relevance due to the fact that in the case of bankruptcy or the addition of a fund the constant track record does not change. The HFRX Equally Weighted Index consists of 47 funds from all major investment strategies. This index suffers from the selection bias and only includes open funds.
In contrast the overall hedge fund universe which is taken to be a representative benchmark is represented by all operating and defunct funds that report to the TASS data base adjusted for onshore duplicates and multiple currency versions of a fund (10,556 Funds). In conclusion, the HFRX index and the representative hedge fund index from the TASS database exhibit very similar distributional properties. In addition, both indices show a similar development over time. Thus, if the use of the HFRX index introduces a bias it is likely to be small. Equity Hedge strategies maintain positions both long and short in primarily equity and equity derivative securities. A wide variety of investment processes can be employed to arrive at an investment decision, including both quantitative and fundamental techniques; strategies can be broadly diversified or narrowly focused on specific sectors and can range broadly in terms of levels of net exposure, leverage employed, holding period, concentrations of market capitalizations and valuation ranges of typical portfolios. Equity Hedge managers would typically maintain at least 50%, and may in some cases be substantially entirely invested in equities, both long and short.
Event Driven
Event Driven Managers maintain positions in companies currently or prospectively involved in corporate transactions of a wide variety including but not limited to mergers, restructurings, financial distress, tender offers, shareholder buybacks, debt exchanges, security issuance or other capital structure adjustments. Security types can range from most senior in the capital structure to most junior or subordinated, and frequently involve additional derivative securities. Event Driven exposure includes a combination of sensitivities to equity markets, credit markets and idiosyncratic, company specific developments. Investment theses are typically predicated on fundamental characteristics (as opposed to quantitative), with the realization of the thesis predicated on a specific development exogenous to the existing capital structure.
Macro
Macro strategy managers which trade a broad range of strategies in which the investment process is predicated on movements in underlying economic variables and the impact these have on equity, fixed income, hard currency and commodity markets. Managers employ a variety of techniques, both discretionary and systematic analysis, combinations of top down and bottom up theses, quantitative and fundamental approaches and long and short term holding periods. Although some strategies employ RV techniques, Macro strategies are distinct from RV strategies in that the primary investment thesis is predicated on predicted or future movements in the underlying instruments, rather than realization of a valuation discrepancy between securities. In a similar way, while both Macro and equity hedge managers may hold equity securities, the overriding investment thesis is predicated on the impact movements in underlying macroeconomic variables may have on security prices, as opposes to EH, in which the fundamental characteristics on the company are the most significant and integral to investment thesis.
Relative Value
Relative Value investment managers who maintain positions in which the investment thesis is predicated on realization of a valuation discrepancy in the relationship between multiple securities. Managers employ a variety of fundamental and quantitative techniques to establish investment theses, and security types range broadly across equity, fixed income, derivative or other security types. Fixed income strategies are typically quantitatively driven to measure the existing relationship between instruments and, in some cases, identify attractive positions in which the risk adjusted spread between these instruments represents an attractive opportunity for the investment manager. RV position may be involved in corporate transactions also, but as opposed to ED exposures, the investment thesis is predicated on realization of a pricing discrepancy between related securities, as opposed to the outcome of the corporate transaction.
Source: Hedge Fund Research (HFR) For reviewer purpose only! 
